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I

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case

I
I

Shannon Marie McKean appeals from her judgment of conviction upon a
jury's verdict that she is guilty of five counts of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver. McKean argues the district court erred when it
excluded

as

irrelevant,

evidence

that

McKean

relied

on

lab

reports

I
I
I

district court erred by instructing the jury that AM-2201 was a controlled

I

2201 is not a Schedule I substance enumerated in I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30), this

I
!
I

I
I
I
I
I

I

accompanying the products she purchased to re-sell. McKean also argues the

substance, citing the Court of Appeals' recent decision in State v. Alley, 155
Idaho 972, 318 P.3d 962 (Ct. App. 2014). To the extent Alley holds that AM-

Court should disavow that holding as a misinterpretation of the statute and its
legislative history. Correctly interpreting and applying Idaho statutory and case
law, this Court should affirm the district court's rulings and McKean's judgment of
conviction.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The state charged McKean with five counts of possessing a controlled
substance with intent to deliver.

(R., pp. 79-81, 305-08.)

Four of the counts

were for possessing products called AK-47, Mad Hatter, Scooby Snax, and
Down2Earth, which contained the substance known as AM-2201. (Tr., Vol. II, p.
362, Ls. 9-11; p. 363, Ls. 5-25;p. 364, Ls. 8-14; R., pp. 79-81.) The fifth count
was for possessing a product called Fire N' Ice which contained the substance
known as JWH-210/122. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 360, Ls. 1-2; R., pp. 79-81.)
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I
I
I

The state filed a pre-trial motion for a ruling that JWH-210/122 and AM2201 are controlled substances. (R., pp. 107-09.) The trial court conducted an
evidentiary hearing at which the parties presented evidence, including testimony
by expert witnesses.

(See Tr., Vol. I.) McKean contested that AM-2201 is· a

controlled substance, but did not dispute that JWH-210/122 fell within Idaho's
Uniform Controlled Substances Act. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 6, L. 22 - p. 7, L. 2.) The trial
court determined that "AM-2201 is a controlled substance that falls within Idaho
Code 37-2705(30)." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 211, Ls. 10-13.) The trial court instructed the
jury to this effect after the close of evidence. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 460, Ls. 3-5; R., p.
381.)
In his opening statement, defense counsel conceded that McKean
possessed and sold the products identified in the state's charging document.
(Tr., Vol. II, p. 139, L. 22 - p. 140, L. 2.)

McKean's defense was that she

believed the products she was selling were not synthetic cannabinoids. (Tr., Vol.
II, p. 175, Ls. 21-24.) The state objected to McKean's opening statement that

I
I
I
I
I
I

the jury would hear evidence McKean relied on lab reports from distributors of
her products

which indicated those products did not contain controlled

substances. (Tr., Vol. 11, p. 144, Ls. 16-22.) The trial court ruled that McKean
could not put on evidence that she relied on those lab reports because such
defense amounted to a mistake-of-law argument; and whether McKean knew or
believed her products were illegal controlled substances was irrelevant. (Tr., Vol.
II, p. 167, L. 3 - p. 170, L. 9.)
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I
I
I
I
I
I
I

The jury found McKean guilty of the five counts of possessing a controlled
substance with intent to deliver.

(R., pp. 396-98.)

The trial court sentenced

McKean to unified terms of five years with two years fixed as to each count, to
run concurrently. (R., pp. 409-12.) McKean timely appealed. (R, pp. 420-22,
426-32.)
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ISSUES
McKean states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err by concluding that AM-2201 was a
controlled substance as a matter of law?

2.

Did the district court err by excluding evidence that Ms.
McKean relied on reports indicating that the substances
were not synthetic cannabinoids?

(Appellant's brief, p. 4.)

The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Applying the statute and rules of statutory construction to the record
before it, did the trial court properly determine that AM-2201 falls within
the definition of a Schedule I controlled substance in I.C. § 372705(d)(30)(ii)(a)? And to the extent State v. Alley, 155 Idaho 972, 318
P.3d 962 (Ct. App. 2014) holds otherwise, should Alley be disavowed?

2.

Has McKean failed to show error by the trial court in excluding evidence
McKean relied on lab reports that showed only a mistake of law and were
therefore irrelevant?
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ARGUMENT
I.

Applying The Statute And Rules Of Statutory Construction To The Record
Before It, The Trial Court Properly Determined That AM-2201 Fits The Definition
Of A Schedule I Controlled Substance Set Forth In I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a);
And To The Extent State v. Alley Holds Otherwise, Alley Should Be Disavowed
A.

Introduction
McKean argues her conviction must be vacated because the jury was

precluded from deciding a factual issue before it when the trial court instructed
the jury that AM-2201 is a controlled substance as a matter of law. (Appellant's
brief, pp. 5-12.) In support, McKean cites the Court of Appeals' recent decision
in State v. Alley, 155 Idaho 972, 318 P.3d 962 (Ct. App. 2014). In that decision,
the Court misapplied principles of statutory interpretation and the rule of lenity in
holding that AM-2201 is not "in the enumerated examples" of a schedule I
controlled substance listed in I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a). 1

kl at_,

318 P.3d at

969. When properly applied, the legislative history and intent dictate that AM2201 is enumerated in the statute by its chemical structure. Accordingly, this
Court should disavow Alley, to the extent it holds otherwise, and affirm the trial
court's determination that AM-2201 fits the statutory definition of a Schedule I
substance.

1

Here as in Alley, the applicable version of I.C. § 37-2075(d) - as referenced
throughout this brief - is the version just prior to that which took effect in 2013
and clarified that AM-2201 is a schedule I controlled substance. (See Tr., Vol. I,
p. 155, Ls. 9-16 (defense expert McDougal testified that the statutory language in
the latest amendment closed loopholes within which AM-2201 - in his opinion had fallen).)
5

B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate courts freely review issues of statutory interpretation. State

v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271,274, 92 P.3d 521,524 (2004); State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho
502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003). Where a statute is unambiguous,
the legislature's "clearly expressed intent ... must be given effect," and there is
no need to apply rules of statutory construction. Doe, 140 Idaho at 274, 92 P.3d
at 524; see also Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho
889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011). However, where "reasonable minds might
differ or be uncertain" as to a statute's meaning, then there is ambiguity, and the
courts "will construe the statute to give effect to the legislative intent." Doe, 140
Idaho at 274, 92 P.3d at 524 (citing In re Williamson, 135 Idaho 452, 455, 19
P.3d 766, 769 (2001)).
Where a criminal statute is ambiguous and such "ambiguity remains after
examining the text, context, history, and policy of the statute," the Idaho Court of
Appeals has held that the rule of lenity applies, such that statute is construed in
favor of the accused. State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, _, 318 P.3d 955, 959
(Ct. App. 2014). The United States Supreme Court has said the rule of lenity
'"comes into operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress
has expressed' ... and 'applies only when, after consulting traditional canons of
statutory construction, we are left with an ambiguous statute."' Burgess v. U.S.,
553 U.S. 124, 135 (2008)(citations omitted); see also Trusdall, 155 Idaho at_,
318 P.3d at 959. "To ascertain legislative intent, the Court examines not only the
literal words

of the

statute,

but the

6

reasonableness of the

proposed

interpretations, the policy behind the statute, and its legislative history." State v.
Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471,475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007). "Statutes must 'be
construed as a whole without separating one provision from another."' Doe, 140
Idaho at 275, 92 P.3d at 525 (citation omitted).
C.

The Trial Court Correctly Determined That AM-2201 Is A Schedule I
Controlled Substance Under I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)
The provision at issue, I.C. § 37-2705, uses nomenclature developed by

the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) to identify or
define what substances are included in Schedule I of Idaho's Uniform Controlled
Substances Act. (See Tr., Vol. I, p. 44, L. 24 - p. 46, L. 23.) In relevant part,
subsection (d)(30)(ii)(a) included "[t]he following synthetic drugs" in Schedule I:
"any compound

structurally derived from

3-(1-naphthoyl)indole

substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl

. by

" I.C. § 37-

2705( d)(30)(ii)( a).
The state's expert Corinna Owsley presented testimony to the trial judge
in pre-trial proceedings that she was part of the team that presented the draft bill
for the drug legislation to the House and Senate committees. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 43,
L. 19 - p. 44, L. 20.) Owsley testified that AM-2201 has a base structure of 3-(1-

naphthoyl)indole (Tr., Vol. I, p. 53, Ls. 7-8), and its "substitution at the nitrogen
atom of the indole ring" is "removal of a hydrogen atom" by "doing a reaction to
change it" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 53, L. 16 - p. 54, L. 11).

Owsley also testified the

substitution is with "a fluoropentyl group." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 54, Ls. 11-15.) Further
explaining "fluoropentyl group" and "alkyl," Owsley testified:

7

Owsley:

Alkyl, in its most narrowest sense, is a carbon
hydrogen chain. The halogenated or the haloalkyl is
a substituted alkyl group, which is first named by
naming the alkyl group and adding the prefix of the
halogen, or the fluoro, in this instance. So we get
fluoropentyl, because we have five carbons, so we
have a pentyl group.

Prosecutor:

Okay. So if I'm understanding right, alkyl is a broader
group, or a parent group. Or am I using the right
words there?

Owsley:

Alkyl is a carbon hydrogen chain, but in this instance,
in the code we were looking at naming these
structures, and we put in alkyl as how you would
name the substituent, and this is named as an alkyl
group.

Prosecutor:

Okay.
It's named as an alkyl group, but more
specifically, fluoroalkyl?

Owsley:

Yes. It's a - it's a haloalkyl, in this instance, because
it's [sic] fluorine is the halogen. It's a fluoroalkyl.

Prosecutor:

Okay. But you didn't put in the term haloalkyl?

Owsley:

No. It was intended to be included with the alkyl
groups.

(Tr., Vo. I, p. 60, L. 11 - p. 61, L. 9.)

Moreover, Owsley testified that she

assisted in the drafting and presentation of the statute to the Idaho Legislature,
and it was her opinion that "AM-2201 is one of the many chemicals or
compounds within Idaho's Schedule I." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 43, Ls. 19-25; p. 47, Ls. 28; p. 97, Ls. 22-24; State's Exhibit 1, p. 2.) Owsley testified that AM-2201 is a
synthetic cannabinoid. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 49, Ls. 2-8, 20-22.)
McKean does not dispute that AM-2201 has a base structure of 3-(1naphthoyl)indole. (Appellant's brief, p. 7.) McKean's expert, Owen McDougal,
like Owsley, testified that the substitution at the nitrogen atom in AM-2201 is a
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haloalkyl. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 162, Ls. 18-19 ("AM-2201 is a haloalkyl attached to the
nitrogen. That's clear as can be.").)

However, in McDougal's opinion, the

language "by substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyf' does
not include AM-2201 because "alkyl" does not encompass "haloalkyl." (Tr., Vol.
I, p. 162, Ls. 4-8, 15-19.)
McDougal testified that the changes in the current "legislation got it right ..
. [')substitution at the nitrogen to any extent['] covers all bases." (Tr., Vol. I, p.
163, Ls. 16-18.) According to McDougal, the statutory language that applied to
McKean's case had a limitation that "has provided loopholes, of which I - it's my
opinion that AM-2201 falls within one of them." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 155, Ls. 11-16.)
McDougal said he believed the current legislation "did a much better job of
encompassing a much wider range of potential drugs than did the [prior
version]." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 155, 9-11.) McDougal further testified, "if the intent were
to be a large umbrella to cover everything, our legislation now does that." (Tr.,
Vol. I, p. 163, Ls. 16-24.)
The competing interpretations of I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a) presented by
Owsley and McDougal, both familiar with IUPAC nomenclature, demonstrate that
the sub-provision is ambiguous. In other words, "reasonable minds might differ
or be uncertain" as to its meaning.

Doe, 140 Idaho at 274, 92 P.3d at 524.

Given the ambiguity, the courts must look to the legislative intent of the statute,
examining "not only ... the literal words of the statute ... but also the context of
those words, the public policy behind the statute and its legislative history."
State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999).
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In Alley, the Court of Appeals, upon finding (d)(30)(ii)(a) ambiguous,
looked to the legislative intent.

155 Idaho at_, 318 P.3d at 969. The Alley

Court quoted the following purpose statement:
The purpose of the legislation is to create safe regulations for the
public concerning Tetrahydrocannabinols from synthetic drugs
(Spice) that mimic the effects of Cannabis and identifying additional
substances to be classified in schedule 1.
This legislation
continues what is currently being enforced by the Board of
Pharmacy. Declaring an emergency.

kl (quoting

Statement of Purpose, HB 139 (2011 )). The Court also quoted from

the statute's preface, providing, "An act relating to uniform controlled substances;
amending Section 37-2705, Idaho Code, to identify additional substances to be
classified in schedule I, and declaring an emergency."
Sess. Laws, ch. 47.)

kl

(quoting 2011 Idaho

Examining the statute as a whole, the purpose and

prefatory statements show the legislature's intent to expand the substances
included in schedule 1.

But in Alley, the Court narrowed its inquiry to the

legislature's intent in using the term "alkyl."

kl

Given the technical nature of the statute's wording, it would be surprising
if the legislative history included discussion of any specific term using the IUPAC
nomenclature - whether "alkyl" or another. Had the legislature or any of the bill's
sponsors anticipated that "alkyl" would result in ambiguity, as it did, the term
likely would have been replaced.

A search for legislative intent or context

behind that single technical term is a futile endeavor, if not an empty gesture,
toward actually resolving the ambiguity.
However, considering the legislature's general purpose to expand the list
of schedule 1 substances, it can be inferred that the term "alkyl" in "substitution
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at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl" is intended to include all alkyls,
including "haloalkyl." (See Tr., Vol. I, p. 61, Ls. 6-9.) The legislature intended to
broadly include any substance having the identified base structure (3-( 1naphthoyl)indole ), with a substituent in the alkyl group, which includes AM-2201.
Indeed, the legislature has since amended (d)(30)(ii)(a) to use the more general
language "by substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring to any extent."
I.C. § 37-2705(d)(31)(ii)(a)(eff. April 3, 2013)(emphasis added).
Legislative amendments can be made "to clarify or strengthen the existing
provisions of a statute." State v. Reed, 154 Idaho 120, 123, 294 P.3d 1132,
1135 (Ct. App. 2013)(citing Pearl v. Bd. of Prof. Discipline of Idaho State Bd. of
Medicine, 137 Idaho 107, 113-14, 44 P.3d 1162, 1168-69 (2002))(other citations
omitted).

In the recent bill revising the Uniform Controlled Substances Act,

ultimately passed into law, prefatory comments indicate legislative intent "to
revise provisions relating to Schedule I controlled substances and to make
technical corrections .... " 2012 Idaho Laws ch. 181 (H.B. 502)(emphasis
added).

As McDougal acknowledged in his testimony at McKean's pre-trial

evidentiary hearing, the latest legislation "got it right" and now includes AM-2201.
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 163, Ls. 16-18.) It is apparent the revised statute was intended to
clarify the version applicable in the Alley case and here.
The Alley Court recognized that the house and senate committee minutes
showed the purpose of the proposed legislation, which was eventually adopted
and passed, was to "target[ ] the 'backbone structure' of the chemicals used to
produce spice variations." Alley, 155 Idaho at_, 318 P.3d at 969. The Court
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recognized that these comments are "consistent with the interpretation forwarded
by the state and the testimony of the state's expert."

kl

However, the Court

rejected the statement's usefulness because it "was not specific to the meaning
of the term 'alkyl' and could have referred to other chemical compounds in the
statute, such as the 3-(1-naphthoyle)indole ... which the state's expert also
referred to as a 'backbone structure."'

kl

The Court fails to explain why the

statement could not be applied to both "alkyl" and "3-(1-naphthoyle)indole."
Such a reading is still consistent with the testimony of the state's expert (in Alley
and here in McKean's case), and does not render the statute a nullity. See Doe,
140 Idaho at 275, 92 P.3d at 525.
The Alley Court also cited I.C. 37-2705(f)(3)(i), which defines "substituted
cathinones" by chemical structure and the notation, "whether or not the
compound is further modified ... [b]y substitution in the ring system to any
extent with alkyl ... [or] haloa/kyl." Alley, 155 Idaho at_, 318 P.3d at 969; I.C.
§ 37-2705(f)(3)(i)(emphasis added). Because that subsection lists both alkyl and

haloalkyl, the Court concluded, the legislature intended to distinguish the terms.
Id.

This supports that there was a need for a "technical correction" in

(d)(30)(ii)(a), which correction was made.

But in light of the revision, the

legislative history ultimately reflects, and public policy supports, that the
legislature's intent was for language regarding substituents in (d)(30)(ii)(a) to
cover AM-2201. There is no dispute the current statute now does so.
The Idaho courts, including the Alley Court, have recognized the need to
examine statutes and their legislative intent in "the context of those words, [and]
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the public policy behind the statute." Alley, 155 Idaho at_, 318 P.3d at 966
(citation omitted); see also Doe, 140 Idaho at 275, 92 P.3d at 525 (citation
omitted). But in Alley, the Court ignored the context of the term "alkyl" as well as
the stated policy of expanding the list of regulated substances known as "spice"
to address an identified public health "emergency." Alley, 155 Idaho at_, 318
P.3d at 969. This Court should reject the Court of Appeals' statutory analysis in
Alley.
In Alley, the Court's interpretation of the term "alkyl" and overly-narrow
application of legislative intent ignored the clearly stated broader purpose of the
statute.

Moreover, the result - the Court's application of the rule of lenity -

achieved the opposite result from statute's stated purpose.

Construing the

statute in favor of the defendant, the Court in Alley concluded that AM-2201 was
not enumerated as a schedule I controlled substance under the statute. Alley,
155 Idaho at_, 318 P.3d at 969. Rather, the Court held that AM-2201 could be
found, on a case-by-case basis, to have "a similar chemical structure" with
schedule I substances, a result inconsistent with the legislative intent.
318 P.3d at 970.

kt

at_,

In light of the record and the legislature's stated intent in

passing the applicable version of 1.C. § 37-2705, the trial court here properly
determined that AM-2201 is a schedule I controlled substance as a matter of law
rather than a jury question. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court's
ruling, and disavow Alley to the extent that decision would require a contrary
result.

13

Even if this Court were to reverse and remand as to the trial court's
conclusion that AM-2201 is illegal, such remand would not affect McKean's
judgment of conviction as to the "spice" containing JWH-210/122. Before trial,
McKean conceded that JWH-210/122 is a schedule I controlled substance. (Tr.,
Vol. I, p. 6, L. 22 - p. 7, L. 2.)

Thus, on Count I, McKean's judgment and

sentence would stand. (R., pp. 306, 396, 409.)

II.
McKean Has Failed To Show Error By The Trial Court In Excluding Evidence
McKean Relied On Lab Reports That Showed Only A Mistake Of Law And Were
Therefore Irrelevant
A.

Introduction
McKean argues the trial court erred when it excluded evidence she relied

on purported lab reports that caused her to believe the substances she bought to
re-sell in her store were legal.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 12-19.)

According to

McKean, the evidence that she relied on these reports was relevant because it
was offered to show its effect on her as listener.

(Appellant's brief, p. 12.)

However, that alleged effect is a mistake of law argument.

As such, the

evidence was not relevant and was properly excluded.
B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court's determination that evidence is relevant is a matter of law

subject to free review. State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363, 247 P.3d 582,
590 (2010).

14

The Record Does Not Support, And McKean Has Failed To Show, Her
Mistake Was One Of Fact Rather Than Law

C.

McKean concedes that a mistake of law is not a valid defense.
(Appellant's brief, p. 16.) However, McKean contends that her mistake was one
of fact, and cites as support, State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698, 703, 132 P.3d 455,
460 (Ct. App. 2006)(abrogation on other grounds recognized in State v. Galvan,
_

P.3d _, 2014 WL 775660 (Ct. App. 2014)(citing Salinas v. Texas, _

U.S.

_, 133 S.Ct. 2174, 2179-80 (2013))). The record distinguishes the facts of this
case from those discussed in Stefani.
In Stefani, the Court of Appeals wrote:
... one might possess an illegal drug under the mistaken
belief that it was a legal substance - for example possessing
methamphetamine while truly believing that it was sugar. In such a
case, the defendant's mistake of fact, if believed by the jury,
requires an acquittal because the criminal intent element of the
offense is not present.
Stefani, 142 Idaho at 703, 132 P.3d at 460. According to McKean, her mistake
was not about the legality of the substances she purchased, but the nature of
what those substances were. (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-17.) In other words, her
mistake was akin to believing - as hypothesized in Stefani - that what she
bought was sugar, or a substance the possession of which is unquestionably
legal.
But here, McKean was charged with possessing "spice" containing AM2201 and JWH-210/122.

Reports concluding that the substances McKean

bought were legal - or evidence that McKean relied on those reports - do not
address a mistake of fact.

They do not show that McKean believed the

substances were something other than spice, such as sugar. They show that
15

she hoped or believed the substances were not illegal.

As McKean has

conceded, her mistake of law is not a defense.
Because the evidence only addressed McKean's mistake of law, it was
not relevant. The trial court therefore properly excluded the evidence.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm McKean's judgment
of conviction.

The trial court did not err in excluding evidence that only

addressed McKean's mistake of law, or in concluding that AM-2201 is a
schedule I controlled substance. This Court should disavow Alley to the extent it
conflicts with the trial court's findings.

If this Court does reverse and remand,

McKean's judgment and sentence as to Count 1, regarding JWH-210/122 must
not be disturbed.

DATED this 28th day of April, 2014.

~~
U

DAPHN~ J. HUANG
Deputy Attorney General
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